I’ll be comparing two laws that reside in different domains and different jurisdictions, so I’m not necessarily speaking in legal terms and mostly in the context of secularism as a principle.

In Canada, Quebec’s governing party, the CAQ, recently passed Bill 21 (a secularism law) that bans the wearing of religious symbols by persons with coercive power in the civil service. This includes police officers as well as teachers in public school boards. As usual, this was seen as especially singling out Muslim women who wear the hijab. But all religious symbols are banned; the hijab, the kippah, the turban, etc. There was also a crucifix that hung in Quebec’s National Assembly which was removed begrudgingly after it was thought the historical significance should be disregarded to show solidarity with persons who would be affected by the law. The law remains much debated and contentious.

The other law is in Canada’s criminal code, Section 319 Subsection 3(b). The law allows hate speech “if, in good faith, the person expressed or attempted to establish by an argument an opinion on a religious subject or an opinion based on a belief in a religious text.” Otherwise, it is a punishable crime by summary conviction. To be sure, an atheist guilty of the same crime would be jailed while a religious person would be acquitted.

A recent CBC article said that religious symbols (in the context of the first law above) were based on “deeply held religious conviction” and should NOT be treated as wearing a hat or, in other words, subject to an official “dress code.” Religious symbols then, should be unequivocally allowed in the civil service.

By the same merit then, repealing Section 319 subsection 3(b) should be unthinkable considering that an offence could be easily proven to be religiously based through doctrinal text. Hate speech laws in Canada are more conservative than in the United States, but it’s the principle I’m talking about; though a U.S. context on hate speech might be instructive. In any case, both the wearing of religious symbols and hate speech could be manifestly considered “deeply held religious convictions.” In a way, speech could be considered more intrinsic to a human being than what one may wear.

If bans on religious symbols are considered unconstitutional because it infringes on freedom of religion rights, then wouldn’t a similar ban on hate speech (based on religious doctrine) be just as caustic?

Wouldn’t the government be intruding on matters of religion if they criminalize one and not the other? Or if they decriminalize one and not the other?